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DEVELOPING NORMATIVE CONSENSUS: HOW THE 
“INTERNATIONAL SCENE” RESHAPES THE DEBATE OVER 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CRITICISM 
 
Ericka Tucker 
 
Can we ever justly critique the norms and practices of another culture? When 
activists or policy-makers decide that one culture’s traditional practice is harmful 
and needs to be eradicated, does it matter whether they are members of that 
culture? Given the history of imperialism, many argue that any critique of another 
culture’s practices must be internal. Others argue that we can appeal to a 
universal standard of human wellbeing to determine whether or not a particular 
practice is legitimate or whether it should be eradicated. In this paper, I use the 
FGC eradication campaigns of the 1980s to show that the internal/external divide 
is complicated by the interconnectedness of these debates on the international 
level. As the line blurs between internal and external criticism and interventions, 
new questions emerge about the representativeness of global institutions.  
 
IS THERE ever a just way to critique the practices of another culture? What are the 
conditions of the possibility of such a critique? Are critical interventions legitimate 
only when they are internal to a particular culture, or as Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum contend, are there always internal streams of dissent into which external 
forces can tap? (Nussbaum and Sen, 1989) 
To understand the practical force of the theoretical debate between internal and 
external criticism, I will examine the case of the FGC
1
 debates in the 1980s and 
1990s. From a Western perspective, FGC is a paradigm case of an act that is clearly 
morally wrong. It is nearly impossible, from a Western perspective, to learn about 
FGC, the practice of clitoredectomy, without horror. We hear of such practices and 
we feel the need to critique, to act, to outlaw, to save, to intervene. However, such 
interventions are not always effective and are often unwelcome. In an increasingly 
globalized world, where the practices that horrify Westerners provide fodder for 
sensationalist journalism and serve as convenient justifications for military or policy 
intervention, critiques of non-Western cultural practices are charged with cultural 
insensitivity at best and imperialism at worst.   
In this paper I will argue that even issues which are understood as just plain 
wrong from an external position still need to be addressed on the basis of internal 
values and concepts. However, as I think the history of the FGC debate shows (and I 
will show below), the internal/external divide is complicated by the 
interconnectedness of internal and external debates on the international level. 
Whether criticism is internal or external is difficult to determine, and in some cases 
the provenance of a particular critique is impossible to identify. It may be impossible 
to say at this point in history that only internal criticism of cultural practices is 
                                                 
1 I will use the term ‘FGC’ for the variety of practices at issue, including clitoredectomy and 
infibulation.  
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permitted, since the boundary between inside and outside of a culture is crossed every 
day by media, international aid and development workers, trade representatives, etc.  
Finally, I will argue that whether criticism of cultural practices is justified internally 
and externally is a question separable from the justice of interventions to eradicate 
criticized practices. Justifiable criticism, internal and external ought to serve as the 
basis of action only through a just, inclusive and democratic process. Criticism, 
whether internal or external, given the difference in judgment among individuals and 
groups, may never be eliminable, nor should it. Only through inclusive democratic 
institutions can critiques of particular practices be justly weighed, and solutions 
defined. If that process is internal to a state, then external intervention may be unjust. 
However, if that process is international, external intervention may be justifiable. 
Criticism of non-western practices too often has foreshadowed armed intervention. 
The legacy of colonialism explains part of the resistance to Western criticism of non-
Western norms and practices. 
Through examining the positions of philosophers and legal theorists in the FGC 
debates I will show how the history of colonial interventions shapes the debate over 
the creation of ‘universal norms’ such as the positive promotion of human rights and 
campaigns to eradicate harmful practices. I will argue that solving the problem of 
FGC does not require better universal norms, but instead necessitates inclusive and 
participatory democratic structures both nationally and internationally.  
FGC seems to represent a head-on collision between Western values and a 
traditional practice still extant and accepted by African women in some countries. It is 
nearly impossible to be a good western subject, a good feminist, etc. and not 
understand something called female genital cutting or female genital mutilation as the 
worst kind of abuse. (Nussbaum, 1999, 122-124) Yet it is a centuries old practice, 
which, even in recent studies is understood as a necessary part of life for men and 
women throughout the areas where it is practiced. (Boyle, 2003) FGC has been 
important both for international interventionist policies, and as an issue for African 
immigrants who import the practice to their new locations in Western countries, like 
France, Britain and the United States. As Isabelle Gunning writes, “Culturally 
challenging practices like female genital surgery represent crucial areas of 
multicultural dialogue for feminists applying international human rights law to the 
specific concerns of women.” (Gunning, 1992, 247) While FGC is viewed with 
revulsion and horror in a western context, Elizabeth Heger Boyle suggests that, 
“Female genital operations enjoy wide community acceptance in practicing cultures.” 
( Boyle, 2003, 791) What appears to one group as a clear moral wrong is accepted as 
unproblematic by its practitioners and participants. When Western feminists and 
international human rights organizations sought to eradicate these practices, their 
interventions were resisted. 
 
I. FGC – A History of Failed Interventions 
 
In this section, I will set out the debates over FGC, and I will show how strategies to 
critique and eradicate the practice have evolved. FGC debates have not developed in a 
vacuum. For some, eradicating FGC is a feminist political project. For others it is a 
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humanitarian development project. It represents to others another paternalistic, neo-
colonial Western intervention, which has little to do with helping women. Western 
feminists and development theorists were mobilized by key texts in feminist theory 
and anthropology, including: Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology, 1978; Frank Hoskens, 
Female Sexual Mutilations: The Facts and Proposals for Action, 1980; Lightfoot-
Klein’s Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circumcision in Africa, 
1989; and Alice Walker’s, Possessing the Secret of Joy, 1992, followed by Pratibha 
Parmar and Alice Walker’s film Warrior Marks (1993).  
The history of FGC eradication campaigns is a history of failed interventions. 
British colonial powers in the Sudan and the Church of Scotland in Kenya 
spearheaded the earliest interventions in the 1920s and 30s. In 1943 the British 
criminalized FGC in the Sudan. Elizabeth Heger Boyle describes the results of this 
criminalization in her book Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global 
Community. She writes, “…as with earlier efforts in Kenya, the law once again 
politicized the issue and, rather than reducing the practice, led to the collective and 
secret circumcision of many girls in a short period.” (Boyle, 2003,791) One early text 
supporting FGC as a traditional practice, and arguing that western attempts to 
eradicate it were part of a neo-colonial project was that of the first president of Kenya, 
Jomo Kenyatta in his book, Facing Mount Kenya (1938).  
In the early years of the post-World War II international governmental 
institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization, state 
interventions on the basis of ‘cultural matters’ were discouraged. (Ibid., 40) In 1959 
the WHO Yearbook claimed that the practice of FGC was outside its purview because 
it was of a “social and cultural rather than a medical nature.” (Ibid., 251) Boyle writes, 
“For decades, the belief that cultural matters were domestic matters foreclosed the 
international intervention to eradicate FGC.” (Ibid., 44) By the late 1970s, FGC and 
other cultural issues had become open to international intervention, partially due to 
the change in strategies and increase in power of international institutions. 
Western feminists brought FGC into the international spotlight at the U.N. 
Decade for Women Conference held in Copenhagen in 1980. At Copenhagen, Fran 
Hoskens and others involved in the ‘Women’s International Network’, insisted on 
calling FGC ‘mutilation’. African delegates referred to the practice as ‘female 
circumcision’ and objected to the phrases ‘mutilation’ and ‘female genital mutilation’ 
as inflammatory. African delegates agreed that FGC elimination, while important, 
wasn’t a priority. Famine and disease made food security and clean water bigger 
concerns for their communities. This clash over FGC drove a wedge between Western 
feminists and the African delegates. (Oyewumi, 2003, 32) By discounting African 
feminists’ priorities, Western feminists involved in the FGC eradication campaign, 
eschewed solidarity with African women. Instead, they aligned themselves with top-
down coercive strategies bringing to bear the power of Western-dominated 
international institutions on African countries. Boyle describes this strategic move on 
the part of Western feminists and how outsiders viewed the campaign. She writes, 
“Rather than resist international norms, Westerners enthusiastically embraced them – 
to the point of assertively challenging any hint of deviation from those norms. The 
manner in which the US targeted FGC reinforced the ‘superiority’ of Western values 
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in the global system.” (Boyle, 2003, 113) After Copenhagen, FGC became a battle over 
who would be able to dominate global discussions of goals for African development. 
African delegates boycotted the rest of the conference for its insensitivity to African 
perspectives. Oyeronke Oyewumi writes, “It became clear during the conferences that 
commemorated the decade that the ideals and norms of Western feminism were the 
new standards by which feminists from other parts of the world would be judged. The 
resistance of third world feminist delegates to these conferences underlined the 
inappropriateness of the assumption that identical development standards can be 
fashioned for all women at all times in all parts of the world.” (Okome, 2003, 89)  
In 1979, the U.N. started holding hearings on FGC, but did not take up the gender 
critiques of patriarchy of feminist activists; instead, they took up critiques of FGC on 
medical grounds. In 1979 the WHO classified FGC as a “traditional practice affecting 
the health of women and children,” (Okome, 2003, 48) transforming it into a public 
health issue. Medical intervention was seen as apolitical and resistance to it irrational. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Western countries began passing anti-FGC ordinances. 
Sweden became the first country to ban the practice in 1982, and in 1985 France 
began prosecuting FGC cases as child abuse. The U.S. passed anti-FGC legislation in 
1996 in response to a much-publicized asylum case of a woman from Togo who was 
seeking political asylum on the basis of FGC.
2
  
By the mid-1990s, the international community shifted away from a concern with 
national sovereignty in cultural matters, and the gender critique of FGC again came to 
the fore. Amnesty International identified FGC as a human rights violation and the 
IMF and World Bank linked development aid to FGC reform.
3
 Countries where FGC 
was practiced and which relied on international aid and support tended to choose 
health and social policy reform rather than criminalization to eradicate FGC.
4
  
More powerful countries, like Egypt, which could resist international pressure, moved 
more slowly in their eradication campaigns. However, Egypt was not immune to all 
forms of international pressure. In 1994, CNN broadcast a live circumcision being 
performed in Egypt while the International Conference on Population and 
Development was being held in Cairo. Although Egypt already had laws banning 
FGC, the practice was widely supported and anti-FGC statutes were rarely enforced. 
Following the events of 1994 debates over criminalization of the practice raged as 
anti-Western forces took up the issue as a mark of resistance. A fatwa supporting 
FGC practices followed CNNs broadcast and the Egyptian government’s perceived 
‘caving’ to Western forces.5 
In the intervening decades, a number of international human rights instruments 
have emerged as tools for feminist arguing against FGC, including: CEDAW (1980), 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1980), the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (1995), the 1994 Plan of Action for the Elimination of Harmful 
                                                 
2 Schroeder-Reid, anti-FGC Bill, 1996, part of Department of Defense Omnibus Appropriations 
Bill. Public Law No. 104-208, 110 Stat.3009-708. 
3 Ibid., 42. 
4 Ibid., 101. 
5 Ibid., 74. 
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Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children. In 1997, the 
World Health Organization, United Nations Children's Fund and United Nations 
Population Fund, unveiled a joint 10-year plan to eliminate FGC within 3 generations. 
One of the three ‘prongs’ of the joint plan includes “de-medicalizing” the arguments 
against FGC, and framing it as a human rights violation.  
 
1. Critiques of Feminist FGC Intervention 
 
To make their case against FGC, Western feminists presented African women as 
victims of their culture, and argued that external interventions were necessary to 
eradicate this harmful practice. However, this was a picture that African women did 
not recognize. Oyeronke Oyewumi, one of the African feminists critical of FGC 
interventions, argues that Western feminists need to recognize African women as 
having power within their cultures. FGC practitioners are most often women, and the 
practice marks individual women as full adult members of their communities. 
Eradicating a practice so embedded in the context and meaning of the lives of 
individuals and their communities is no simple matter. By treating African women as 
pawns in a patriarchal system, or victims of torture, Western feminists disempowered 
and marginalized the very women they are trying to help.  
 
2. Sensationalism and Backlash 
 
Western feminists were unwilling to recognize that the African women gained much 
of their power from their cultural location, and that any increase in power would have 
to be negotiated partially in the terms of that culture.  Legal theorists Isabelle 
Gunning and Kristin Savell argue that feminists in the FGC campaign were 
insensitive to culture, and seemingly unconcerned about coordinating their eradication 
efforts with those internal to the communities, which practiced FGC. Feminists 
sensationalized the practices for media attention and to gain political support, 
alienating themselves and the campaign from African women in practicing countries.  
The “arrogance” and “perceived disrespect” of western feminists for African women, 
“impedes dialogue and effectiveness.” (Gunning, 1992, 230) Instead of coordinating 
with local groups, whose positions on FGC were more nuanced and included 
compromise measures, FGC campaigners continued to be absolutist, and seemed 
unable to mould their strategies and rhetoric to become effective in the communities 
where FGC was practiced. Gunning writes, “Because of the multicultural nature of 
the human rights system and the sensitivities of the issue, how the problem is 
presented and discussed increases in importance.” (Gunning, 1992, 233) It seemed as if 
western feminists did not want to ‘dilute’ their message by making it relevant to the 
local context, and acceptable to local people. By failing to do so, they risked 
irrelevance, and made their continued interventions and invocations of international 
intervention seem more like coercion than political persuasion.  
By misunderstanding and then sensationalizing the issue of FGC without being 
sensitive to the backlash that this caused within African women’s communities, 
Western feminists in the FGC project alienated African women in a single-minded 
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crusade to eradicate the practice. As Savell writes, “Outsider criticism that is 
insensitive to local contexts may indeed be ultimately counter-productive by 
undermining the efforts of internal critics seeking to gain cultural legitimacy for their 
position.” (Savell, 1996, 817)  By failing to appreciate the role of culture and of 
political context, Western feminists’ political tactics backfired, increasing resistance 
to the practice and alienating potential allies. 
 
II. Learning from Failed Interventions 
 
What can we learn from the mistakes made by feminist interventions in the FGC 
debates? Martha Nussbaum and Isabelle Gunning take up this question but propose 
quite different solutions. Legal theorist Isabelle Gunning focuses on the importance of 
culture, and proposes that Western feminists need to understand African women’s 
cultural and political context as well as their own to create a self-reflexive 
transnational feminist movement. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum agrees that 
understanding cultural context and self-reflexivity are important steps in a feminist 
intervention; however, she argues that there is still a place for universal theorizing.  
 
1. The Capabilities Approach 
 
Martha Nussbaum argues that without universal norms, external interventions and 
critiques are unjustified, and so she focuses her work on developing a universal 
normative political theory. Nussbaum’s version of the ‘Capabilities Approach’ sets 
out central human capabilities that every nation should protect. These capabilities 
include:  
 
1. Life  
2. Bodily health 
3. Bodily integrity 
4. Senses, imagination, thought 
5. Emotions 
6. Practical reason 
7. Affiliation 
8. Other species 
9. Play 
10. Control over one's environment (Nussbaum, 1999, 41-2) 
 
Providing a ‘universal’ model of human flourishing, Nussbaum argues, is a necessary 
first step to identifying harmful norms and practices. Nussbaum recognizes that 
identifying a harmful practice and intervening in another’s culture or country to 
eradicate a practice are two quite different enterprises. 
One of the major critiques of FGC interventions was the failure of Western 
feminists to understand and work within the contexts of African communities that 
practice FGC. In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum argues that 
interventions on behalf of women in other cultural contexts must be careful, and must 
be sensitive to the context and the self-understanding of those women. She argues 
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that, “we need to ask whether the framework we propose, if a single universal one, is 
sufficiently flexible to enable us to do justice to the human variety we find.” 
(Nussbaum,2000, 40) She counsels Western feminists to be sensitive to cultural context, 
particularly in the case of what she calls ‘challenging cultural practices’. She writes 
(of the Indian context), “If Western feminists speak of Indian issues such as sati or 
dowry deaths, they will do so productively only if they understand the issues fully in 
their historical and cultural contexts.”( Ibid) Further, she offers the following general 
advice about contextual specificity and feminist theorizing: “In general, any 
productive feminism must be attentive to the issues that people really face and to the 
actual history of these issues, which is likely to be complex.” (Ibid., 41)  
In “Internal Criticism and the Indian Rationalist Tradition”, Nussbaum argues 
that the best strategies for inter-cultural criticism appeal to internal critiques of the 
culture which use internally-culturally shared norms and principles upon which to 
base their critique. Accordingly, to properly evaluate a culture, with an eye to 
criticism and change, one must take an internal critical position. (Nussbaum
 
and Sen, 
1989) Criticism, she argues, must be internal, using resources taken from within that 
tradition’s history and human experience.  Indeed, only by appeal to commonly 
understood internal exemplars and ideals can one be effective in generating any kind 
of critical change. Nussbaum shows how internal criticism is more effective in 
changing social norms, and that any external criticism can rely on, learn from, and use 
critical elements in the culture itself to promote change. One can criticize from an 
external position, but in order to do so and be effective, one must ‘learn the language’ 
so to speak. Legitimate and effective external criticism and interventions require 
immersion in the culture in order to understand what the people of that culture value 
and what their practices mean in context. Nussbaum’s understanding of context and 
culture makes important use of the fact that cultures are not univocal, that there are 
strands of resistance within them which seem to appeal to the same goals and norms 
as those of the capabilities paradigm. With regard to how the capabilities are 
measured with respect to certain policy decisions, Nussbaum writes, “We cannot 
really see the meaning of an incident or a law without setting it in its context and 
history.” (Nussbaum, 2000, 9) Context provides the basis for judging whether 
something violates a capability or enhances a capability.   
Nussbaum begins her theorizing from the problem of women’s situation in the 
developing world. Human development reports show that no country, according to 
measures of education, life expectancy or wealth, treats its women citizens as well as 
men citizens. (Ibid., 2) In developing countries this disparity is worse because gender 
is correlated with poverty. (Ibid., 3) She characterizes this situation as an “acute failure 
of human capabilities.” (Ibid., 3) Nussbaum believes this situation unjust, and sets out 
to come up with a theory of justice that will take seriously the unjust conditions of a 
large percentage of women in the world.  
A primary component of her program is the need to take each individual 
seriously as an end, not just a means to the ends of others. Justice for women, 
Nussbaum argues, cannot be achieved through justice for communities or families. 
The long history of women’s needs and interests being subordinated to those of the 
family or community means that the wellbeing of the group may come at the expense 
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of the wellbeing of individual women. Nussbaum espouses political liberalism, a view 
that takes individuals as the basic units of justice. She argues that, despite its critics, 
liberalism offers “a form of universalism that is sensitive to pluralism and cultural 
difference; in this way it enables us to answer the most powerful objections to cross-
cultural universals.” Ibid., 8) Nussbaum’s articulation of human capabilities is meant 
to identify the core set of human capabilities that need to be protected, regardless of 
particular cultural norms. Because these capabilities are fundamental, they can be 
accepted or are already supported by a wide range of cultures. As already widely 
supported, Nussbaum proposes that they can be the basis of a cross-cultural normative 
standard, which can be differently realized in terms of functioning in different cultural 
contexts.  Nussbaum writes:  
My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus 
on what is common to all, rather than on differences (although, as we shall see, it does 
not neglect these), and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at 
the core of human life than others. Its primary opponents on the contemporary scene 
will be ‘anti-essentialists’ of many types, thinkers who urge us to begin not with 
sameness but with difference—both between women and men and across groups of 
women—and to seek norms defined relatively to a local context and locally held 
beliefs. (Ibid., 63)  
Nussbaum argues that attention to context is important, but that what is essential 
is the development of universal standards by which we can judge cultural practices to 
ensure that every individual is able to live a decent human life. 
In Sex and Social Justice Nussbaum argues that liberal feminists have a moral 
responsibility not just to critique but to intervene in the struggle for women’s justice 
worldwide. Failure of a government to protect these capabilities would open up 
possibilities for external intervention. In “Judging Other Cultures” Nussbaum steps 
into the FGC debate, arguing that since FGC blocks central universal human 
capacities, it is a legitimate target for external international intervention. Nussbaum 
argues that since FGC violates a major capability, ‘Bodily Integrity’, it is a practice 
that should be banned. She defines ‘bodily integrity’ as, “Being able to move freely 
from place to place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual 
assault; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of 
reproduction.” (Nussbaum, 1999, 41) Given the health risks involved in FGC, it could 
also be critiqued and banned as a violation of the capabilities protecting ‘life’ and 
‘bodily health’. Despite her recognition of the importance of contextual negotiation of 
cultural change, Nussbaum judges FGC to be so harmful that the value of cooperation 
with practicing countries is nullified. In the case of FGC, universal norms, the 
capabilities trump the value of internal criticism. Nussbaum’s argument that 
‘universal’ norms must exist in some form in every culture seems to provide a 
conveniently thin edge of the wedge justifying full-scale international interventions.  
 
2. We Don’t Need Another Universal: the Dialectic of Universal and Particular in 
FGC Campaigns 
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One of the major critiques of western feminist intervention in the FGC debate was 
that they set themselves up as the universal and the standard, and judged African 
women and African cultures as ‘particular’ in relation to this universal. Isabelle 
Gunning, in her article “Arrogant Perception, World-Traveling, and Multicultural 
Feminism,” argues that Western feminists’ disavowal of the of the particularity of 
their culture is a common problem in such situations of cultural clash, where the 
Western theorist not only has the weight of history and power behind her theory, but 
also the ability to disavow this history and how the power was gained, thus speaking 
as a representative of the universal. Critics of the feminist FGC intervention do not 
argue that only internal critique is necessary or justified, since African feminists in 
particular, seem to have an understanding that the internal politics of their cultures are 
bound up with international norms and institutions and with histories of colonialism 
in such a way that the internal and external have always been interrelated. Rather, 
they suggest that external interventions should be cognizant of the internal cultural 
and political circumstances, and of the status of the external interveners’ cultural 
context and its relation to the internal cultural context into which they are intervening. 
This understanding of cultural context on both sides is important so that the 
intervention can be effective, so that it might improve the lives of women instead of 
making them more difficult by causing backlash.  
While it appears at first that Nussbaum takes cultural context into consideration, 
a closer look reveals that while she takes the other person’s culture into consideration, 
she does not reflect on her own position as tied to a particular culture with a history. 
She believes that she can come up with universal norms from within her own cultural 
tradition which can be used to trump other cultural traditions and practices. In 
ignoring the context of her own culture and the history of setting up its values as 
universal, can we understand Nussbaum as engaging in ethnocentric theoretical 
practice? First, we should take a detour into the consideration of ‘positionality’, and 
what culture has to do with what one says, and how what one says is heard by others.  
 
3. Positionality: The Role of Culture 
 
While Nussbaum takes cultural relativist arguments and arguments from cultural 
imperialism seriously, she does not take into account the powerful role of culture and 
‘internal’ political contexts in determining whether an argument is a good one, 
whether it can be politically effective or even heard in a particular context. In short, 
she does not attend sufficiently to the question of how context determines what a 
political argument or position means. What does it mean to be inside a culture, a 
member of a society, or part of a tradition, or a history? At the very least it means 
being part of a tradition of interpretation. To wit, being a member of a culture means 
coming to understand the world in terms of one’s culture. One is a part of a history, 
and this history shapes how one understands what events mean, and what institutions 
mean. This cultural understanding does not have to be univocal; the strands of 
interpretation that are available within a culture may be rich. However, the arguments 
between different groups within a country themselves have a history. The meaning, 
efficacy, and weight of a set of reasons or justifications must deal with this historical, 
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political, cultural context. Where one is located, the political and cultural context in 
which one lives and wages political battles, influences the kinds of things one can 
argue for and the kinds of reasons that one appeals to in order to justify one’s 
position. This is the case both for Nussbaum, who appeals to the tradition of liberal 
theory and to the history of justifications for some kinds of policies which focus on 
individual, as well as for Muslim feminists who appeal to the Koran or to sharia law 
to justify their positions and reform policy.   
Nussbaum understands that cultures are different, and so argues that the 
capabilities that she champions may be multiply realizable. However, recognizing this 
important point about cultural difference should allow her to see that different types 
of theorizing and argument from a different set of premises may be necessary in 
different cultural, historical, political settings. Cultural specificity, and different 
histories may make people from different cultures see things in different ways, argue 
on the basis of different historical evidence, and view certain kinds of theorizing and 
justification as illegitimate. In this line of thinking there is a general argument that 
what counts as a reason depends on the context in which one is arguing, but I wish to 
make no claims about cultural relativism or rationality. Political arguments tend to 
draw from evidence which is historically and affectively motivating, as well rationally 
justified. The process of reasoning may well be universal, but what count as reasons 
vary from context to context. To be effective and legitimate, critics must take their 
historical, political, and cultural context into consideration.  
Following Uma Narayan, it seems that keeping a scorecard tallying which 
argument comes from within a culture, to which comes from without is not only 
unwise, it may be impossible. (Narayan, 1997) Identifying which ideas are internal, and 
which ideas are external may not be that important, but determining which ideas are 
politically effective does require understanding the internal context of a 
culture/state/region. Further, understanding the external relations of that state, and 
how the internal debate plays on the international level (external) is important, given 
the power of the international political scene on the developments in particularly post-
colonial nations. Marxist rhetoric, while powerful internally to many post-colonial 
nations, may get one in trouble with the international community, and thus may have 
no small economic or military consequences. 
Perhaps the difference between creating norms and identifying cultural universals 
is just a difference in language – but it is a difference of language and practice that 
matters at the international level, where worries about western hegemony persist, and 
the language of universals developed from a western tradition are viewed with 
skepticism. However, if a genuine multicultural dialogue is necessary to create global 
consensus on norms, then perhaps not only the language of international normative 
political theorizing must change, but there must be change at the level of international 
institutions, in terms of the degree of participation of those countries which are 
affected by them. Recommendations should include not just suggestions for how to 
argue in an international context, but recommendations for how the international 
structures should be changed in order to allow these recommendations to take hold.  
If we are to create legally binding norms in international forums, then the 
legitimacy of those norms depends on the degree of representation and involvement 
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of those affected by these decisions. Since African women and the countries they 
inhabit are generally underrepresented in such global forums, the legitimacy of 
decisions is questionable. By excluding African women from democratic participation 
in the decisions that affect their lives, global feminist or human rights interventions 
further disempower the women their campaigns seek to help. Democratic reform of 
international institutions and the inclusion of underrepresented groups, particularly 
women, should be a focus for feminist activism insofar as such representation affects 
the legitimacy of internationally supported feminist reforms.  
 
4. FGC, External Intervention and the International System 
 
External interventions in the case of FGC raise both strategic and legitimacy 
questions. The strategic questions focus on what kinds of appeals will be effective in 
particular contexts. The legitimacy question – what kinds of appeals are legitimate, in 
a particular context, and simpliciter. Clearly, the two elements of the intervention 
question – the strategic and the legitimacy question are important for Nussbaum. But 
when we look at questions of how to eradicate a particular practice as part of a global 
political strategy, it then becomes clear that in particular circumstances, the strategic 
and legitimacy questions intertwine. However, when we are talking about 
international intervention, a global political movement, or global forces which 
intersect internal or local debates in a variety of ways, appeals to ‘local’ or internal 
standards are not as precise as they may seem. Arguments that only internal criticism 
of cultural practices is justified are undermined by the fluidity of the boundaries 
between the national and the international, the historical interconnection through 
colonialism and global trade, and the international connection through existing and 
emerging international institutions. Powerful Western countries often dominate 
international institutions, like the U.N. Although the U.N. may have little coercive 
power against stronger nations, its language of human rights and its regime of 
conventions and treaties form a normative language to which both internal and 
external critics of traditional practices appeal.  
The U.N. is an international body where social, political, and economic norms 
are created through the creation of international conventions which member states 
sign. Thus, any state that is a member of the U.N. has not only its internal cultural 
background and internal political scene but also its connection to the international 
context. The level of power of the international norms at the national level depends on 
historical, economic, and political factors. Economically, if one is currently receiving 
aid from an international institution, the pressure to conform to international norms 
will be stronger, although internal resistance to such conformity may also be high. In 
terms of political situation, if one’s country has been invaded by another more 
powerful state with greater representation and power at the international level, support 
for international norms may waver. Historically, if one’s state is a former colony of 
one of the major powers, then one’s system may have been modeled on that of the 
former colonial power. This may lead to deeper connections with the norms of that 
power, or greater resistance to international bodies whose norms have been 
substantially created by that former colonial power. Often, cultural, economic and 
118 WENYU XIE 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
 
political ties between former colonies and their former imperial power are complex, 
contentious and sometimes extremely powerful.  
For most countries, their internal political scene is in some ways formed (either 
in conformity, or in resistance) to international norms, and thus there may be an 
element of what is generally understood to be ‘external’ operating at the level of the 
‘internal’ political scene. The existence of this external in the internal undermines 
arguments that only internal criticism is valid, since external norms filter through to 
the national or internal level already. This is not to say that there is a strong consensus 
at the international level, or that all countries involved support developments on the 
international level.  
The ‘international scene’ is not a party of equals. Not all members of the 
international community of nations are equal. Poor nations are expected to and often 
economically coerced into accepted treaties, conventions and protocols to which they 
have been allowed to make little contribution. More powerful nations have a greater 
voice in international institutions and rarely act as disinterested parties. The very 
instruments of international consensus, treaties, conventions, and protocols are subject 
to self-interested interpretation by powerful countries. Powerful countries can ignore 
norms by which poorer countries are bound. Since the apparatus of international 
governance is dominated by more powerful states, it is no wonder its conventions and 
normative regime are viewed skeptically by poor countries. 
Although the existence of this international regime of rights blurs the line 
between internal and external criticism of traditional practices, providing ground for 
internal and external interventions, the imbalance in power with respect to those who 
develop the norms (which are then used as conditions for intervention) and those who 
must accept the norms to be part of the international community (thus making the 
external grounds of criticism justifiably available internally) undermines the 
legitimacy of these international norms, such that they can still be understood as 
‘external’ even to those countries who might sign on to an international treaty. The 
coercion, based on an imbalance of power at the international level, undermines the 
legitimacy of international norms. Those with the power to intervene and to shape 
international consensus have the power to impress upon others their ways of life, their 
values, and their traditions. How can trust be built in such interactions? How can the 
international community and development efforts be seen as something other than a 
tool of the West in general or of the U.S. in particular? What has caused the varieties 
of backlash against western imposed values, constitutional commitments, etc? Both 
Gunning and Kristin Savell have proposed reforming the international normative 
consensus building process on the model of a multi-cultural dialogue, creating ground 
on which inter-cultural understanding can lead to development of shared international 
norms. (Savell, 1997, 781)  Building democratic institutions at the level of the global 
builds trust, provides legitimacy for intercultural critique and sets the stage for 
transnational cooperation that goes beyond the dichotomy of internal and external 
criticism.  
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5. The International Public Sphere 
 
We do not yet have a robust participatory international public sphere where the 
peoples of the world can come together and decide the future of their shared world. At 
present, a portion of the world’s political elites come together, with differential 
power, and trade papers and sign non-binding conventions. The international arena, 
itself a product of Western history and a kind of universal-political theorizing, is still 
dominated by rich Western countries, for the most part. The U.S. tends not to sign on 
to important and popular conventions (CEDAW being a glaring example), and so 
undermines the power and effectiveness of this international forum. Greater 
cooperation of all the world’s countries, especially the richest and most powerful, and 
reformed processes by which greater participation of non-elites within these countries 
have greater access and input in the process are needed for this potential arena for 
normative consensus building to be just and effective. 
If we were able to answer this call to reform international institutions, to make 
them more democratic, to view the work of the international forums in terms of a 
multicultural dialogue aiming at developing normative consensus, then we would go a 
long way toward answering the critiques of those who charge Western interventions 
with ethnocentrism, imperialism, etc., in the international sphere, by opening this 
sphere up to a broader range of the worlds population, and making them more 
genuinely representative bodies, and less as mouthpieces for Western hegemony. 
There is an entirely separate question about the political will to make this 
democratization of the U.N. happen, and this is something that is not outside of the 
issues in this paper, but in fact goes to the heart of what is problematic about Western 
normative political theorizing in a universalist vein. If our values, expressed through 
normative political theories like Nussbaum’s, were really able to compete with those 
of other cultures on an equal footing, then perhaps other capabilities would come to 
the fore. Calling a theory ‘universal’ does not make it so. So, perhaps we should stop 
calling the theories which arise out of our particular tradition ‘universal’, and argue 
that members of other cultures should adopt them on bases that might be acceptable to 
them. By doing so we can create consensus rather than whitewash genuine differences 
under the banner of universality.  
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